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1. INTRODUCTION 
Long-standing questions about how widespread is the occurrence of collusion in industries 
having several firms, and about the extent to which the performance of industries experiencing 
such collusion departs from the competitive norm, continue to provoke spirited debate. In this 
paper we offer a theory of collusive industry equilibrium which will provide a means of 
clarifying these questions. 
In his classic paper 'A Theory of Oligopoly' (14), George Stigler appealed to dynamic 
considerations to explain how apparently cooperative industry performance might result from 
noncooperative motives. According to this theory, the firms of an industry form a cartel, which 
is designed to enforce monopolistic conduct in a self-policing way. 'Self-policing' means 
precisely that the agreed-upon conduct is noncooperatively viable and that it remains so over 
time. 
Stigler's theory differs markedly from traditional oligopoly theories based on static equilibrium 
concepts (e.g., Cournot and Stackelberg). This difference is particularly striking in the case of 
an industry structure which is essentially immune from entry. The traditional theories would 
suggest that the performance of such an industry should be largely determined by its degree of 
concentration - the number of firms in the industry and their relative sizes - and by the 
extent to which substitute goods are available. In contrast, Stigler suggested that the greatest 
obstacle to collusion in the absence of entry would be what he characterized as 'secret price 
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cutting." By informally relating concentration and various other features of industry structure to 
the immunity of a cartel from entry and to its ability to deter inimical firm behavior, and by 
assuming that industry profitability reflects successful operation of a cartel, he justified the use 
of cross-industry regressions to test his theory. 
The obvious interpretation of Stigler is that he made explicit a theory of oligopoly which 
implicitly conceived of a cartel as a 'policeman' which with some frequency is required to 
punish destabilizing 'offenses' of individual cartel members. The somewhat different 
interpretation of this paper is that Stigler had a view of cartel organization as an instance of an 
optimization problem: to design an institution which achieves an efficient equilibrium outcome 
subject to the constraint that agents in the institution behave noncooperatively. On this 
interpretation, the optimal cartel structure may be one which provides member firms with 
strong positive incentives which make collusive behavior attractive, rather than one which 
provides insufficient incentives and which severely punishes defecting firms after the fact. 
In fact, two formulations of the cartel problem exist already which treat noncooperative 
collusion in a rigorous way. Osborne (8) proposes a reaction function equilibrium in which 
firms respond to changes in output by other firms in order to maintain their proportionate share 
of industry output. (See also the extensions of Spence (12,13).) Knowing that other firms will 
respond in this manner, each firm will realize that it does not pay to deviate from the collusive 
output level. 
Friedman (3), on the other hand, outlines a strategy in which firms respond to suspected 
cheating, which they infer from a drop in the market price below the price that obtains when all 
firms produce at agreed-upon levels, by producing at Cournot levels thereafter. If future profit 
streams are discounted sufficiently slowly, than a firm would reduce the discounted value of its 
returns by failing to collude. Therefore, for all firms to adopt the collusive strategy would be a 
noncooperative equilibrium. 
The trouble with these formulations, from an applied industrial organization viewpoint, is that 
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incentives in these equilibria are so perfect that the deterrent mechanisms are never observed. 
Then it may be difficult to infer from econometric time-series evidence whether the observed 
market data is the outcome of a quasicompetitive or collusive equilibrium (cf. T. Bresnahan 
[2]). The substance of the present contribution is that this perfection is an artifact of the 
certainty world in which these models are formulated. When the considerations of imperfect 
information, which played a decisive role in Stigler's theory, are reintroduced, optimal incentive 
structures may involve episodic recourse to the kind of short-run unprofitable conduct which 
would have been characterized as 'price wars' or 'punishment' previously. 
Our argument has three parts. First, we frame a precise definition of collusion in terms of 
industry conduct. Second, we show that collusive conduct may, in a particular industry 
structure, result in a pattern of industry performance marked by recurrent episodes in which 
price and profit levels sharply decrease. Thus we reject the received view that performance of 
this type necessarily indicates an industry where firms are engaging in a sequence of abortive 
attempts to form a cartel. Since this opinion is often used as a basis to deny the need for 
intervention to promote competition in such industries (because the market purportedly is 
already withstanding the collusive assaults), our argument suggests the need to reexamine a 
widely-held assumption about policy. 
Third, we point out that the distinctive character of the phenomenon just discussed and the 
necessary appearance of this phenomenon if collusion is to take place (given the particular 
industry structure in question) make it possible to draw clear-cut conclusions about the 
presence or absence of collusion in some specific industries on the basis of market data. This is 
a singular opportunity to learn about whether collusion does indeed exist in situations where it 
might plausibly occur, without having to face the many problems of interpretation surrounding 
the usual cross-industry tests of its extent. 1 
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2. COLLUSION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Collusive equilibria exhibiting stable performance may possibly characterize some industries. 
For instance, a market might be segmented geographically because firms have divided it. As 
long as this agreement was adhered to, each firm would be a monopolist within its area. 
Moreover, poaching by one firm in another's territory would be quickly and surely detected, 
and would invite retaliation. In that situation, no one would poach. All that would ever. be 
'observed' is monopolistic conduct. 2 
Similarly, in an industry in which contracts are awarded by competitive bidding, a scheme to 
rotate winning bids might be perfectly enforceable. Each firm would act as a monopolist when
its turn came, and would clearly see that bidding low out of turn would jeopardize a profitable 
arrangement. Again, only monopolistic conduct would ever be 'observed. '3 
We will study a model in which demand fluctuations not directly observed by firms lead to 
unstable industry performance. Intuitively firms will act monopolistically while prices remain 
high, but they will revert for a while to Cournot behavior when prices fall. Specifically, it will 
be assumed that firms agree on a 'trigger price' to which they compare the market price when 
they set their production.4 Whenever the market price dips below the trigger price while they 
have been acting monopolistically, they will revert to Cournot behavior for some fixed amount 
of time before resuming monopolistic conduct. 
Suppose that, at a given time, firms are supposed to be colluding (i.e., they expect one another 
to collude). If a firm produces more than its share of the monopoly output, its net return at 
that time will increase. However, by increasing the probability that the market price will fall 
below the trigger price, the firm incurs a greater risk that the industry will enter a reversionary 
episode during which profits will be low for everyone. For producing its monopolistic share to 
be the firms' noncooperatively optimal action, the marginal expected loss in future profits from 
possibly triggering a Cournot reversion must exactly balance (in terms of present discounted 
value) the marginal gain from over-producing. Of course, a reversionary episode will 
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sometimes occur without any firm defecting, simply because of low demand. Thus, over a long 
period, both Cournot behavior and collusive behavior will be observed at various times. In this 
respect, collusion under uncertainty differs markedly from the collusive equilibria under 
certainty discussed earlier. The fact that both monopolistic and Cournot performance are 
observed will make it possible to identify statistically the collusive equilibrium under 
uncertainty. 
We now address the question of exactly what sort of industry our model might appropriately 
describe. Such an industry would have a structure possessing four features. 
First, the industry is presumed to be stable over time. Temporal stability is required if the 
assumption that firms have rational expectations - an assumption which underlies the use of 
Nash equilibrium - is to be credible. On a more technical level, it justifies the use of 
stationary dynamic programming to characterize equilibrium. 
Second, output quantity is assumed to be the only decision variable which firms can manipulate. 
In particular, firms should not be. able to engage in product differentiation or have ability to 
divide their market regionally. With firm decisions so restricted, noncooperative cartel 
incentive schemes other than Cournot reversion are ruled out. In particular, even if one firm 
were suspected of violating a cartel agreement, other firms would have no way of isolating it 
and punishing it differentially. 
Third, except for each firm's private knowledge about its present and past production, 
information about the industry and its environment is public. The Nash equilibrium 
assumption presupposes that firms have an accurate idea of their competitor's cost functions, 
for example. Also, for firms to coordinate effectively in keeping track of whether the industry 
is in a collusive or a reversionary state, they must all observe the realization of a common 
variable. 
Fourth, the information which firms use to monitor whether the cartel is in a collusive or 
reversionary state must be imperfectly correlated with firms' conduct. Otherwise, if compliance 
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were optimal for firms in collusive periods, reversion would never occur. Price is not the only 
information variable which could be used for monitoring - price data with correction for a 
systematic demand component, or market share information, would also be subject to error. 
However, this assumption of imperfect information is incompatible with transactions in the 
industry being few and publicly announced, (e.g., with individual contracts being awarded on 
the basis of sealed-bid auctions) or with completely accurate and current market-share 
information being available to firms. 
In our model firms monitor market price, which imperfectly reflects the output levels of other 
firms. We assume that the products of the firms are of homogeneous quality, and so they face 
a common market price. This structure is adopted for expositional ease. An environment in 
which firms monitored their own market share, which imperfectly reflected the price choices of 
other firms, would be more in the spirit of Stigler's paradigm. 
We now give a formal description of collusion under uncertainty as a Nash equilibrium in 
contingent strategies. Consider an oligopoly of n firms which produce an undifferentiated 
product in a stationary and time separable environment. This environment is like that 
described in Friedman [3], except that demand is subject to multiplicative uncertainty. 
Specifically, i,j range over firms l ,. . .,n. 11'1:R_f-+ R is the return/unction of i. 11'1(x1,p) is i's 
net return from producing x1 units and selling at price p. {J is the discount rate. Firms are risk 
oo n 
neutral and maximize E[� {3111'1(x11,p1)]. Observed price p1 = 81p(� x11), where p:R+-+ R+.
I� . �I 
The random variables 81 are i.i.d. with c.d.f. F having continuous density f. E(8),;.. 1. Each 
81 is a demand shock which firms cannot observe directly.5 
A contingent strategy for firm i is an infinite sequence s1 = (s10,s11,. .. ), where s1o is a determinate 
initial output level x10, and s11+1:R!t1 -+ R+ determines i's output level at time t + 1 as a 
function of past prices by S11+1(p0,. • .,p1) =Xu+•· The choice of domain reflects the assumption 
that firms do not observe rivals' production levels directly. 
. 7. 
A strategy profile (s ., ... s.) determines recursively a stochastic process of prices, which in turn 
induces a probability distribution on the space of infinite sequences of prices. Expectation with 
respect to this distribution will be denoted by E,1 ... , .. 
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (s� , ... s:) which satisfies 
(l) 
for all firms i and feasible strategies s1• 
Now consider how the industry might produce at a monopolistic level most of the time (i.e., 
except during reversionary episodes) in a Nash equilibrium in trigger price strategies. Firms 
will initially produce their respective shares of this restricted industry output, and will continue 
to do so until the market price falls below a trigger price if. Then they will produce Cournot 
outputs for the duration (we will specify this to be T - l periods) of a reversionary episode, 
regardless of what happens to prices during this time. At the conclusion of the episode, T 
periods after the price drop, they will resume monopolistic production. This will continue until 
the next time that p1 < if, and so forth. 6 
Formally, let y = (y., ... .y.) be a profile of restricted outputs, and let z = (z., ... ,z.) be a 
Cournot output profile. Choose a price level ii and a length of time T. Define time t to be 
normal if (a) t = 0, or (b) t - l was normal and ii S Pt-h or (c) t -T was normal and 
Pi-T < p. Define t to be reversionary otherwise. Define strategies for firms by 
{ y if t is normal 
X11 - z: if t is reversionary 
These are well-defined policy strategies. 
Each firm faces a stationary two-state (normal and reversionary) T- stage Markov dynamic 
programming problem. Its optimal policy is to produce z1 in reversionary periods, and to 
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produce some fixed quantity r in normal periods. Let V,(r) be the expected discounted present 
value of firm i if it sets xu = r in normal periods. Define 
w1 = � y1, -y1(r) = E111'1(r,8p(r + w,)), o, = E11l'1 [z,,Opf � z1]] 
}Pl LJS• 
In normal periods, ; anticipates that the aggregate output of the other firms will be w,, and so 
'Yt (r) is the expected profit of then producing r. The expected profit in reversionary periods is 
o1• Let Pr(') denote probability with respect to the distribution of 8. We assume that 
'Yt (y1) > o1 for each firm i. Then V, satisfies the functional equation 
V,(r) = -y1(r) + {JPr(ji S Op(r + w,))V,(r)
+Pr(Op(r + w1) <P> [°i1 {J1o1 +{JrV,(r)] 
1-1 
Pr(Op(r + w1) <if) = F(ji/p(r + w1)), so (2) is equivalent to 
-y1(r) + F(ji/p(r+w1)) (({J-{JT)/(l-{J))o1V. (r) -I 
l -fJ + ({J - {JT)F(ji/p(r + w,)) .
-y1(r) - o, o1 
l - fJ + ({J - {JT)F(ji/p (r +Wt)) 
+ I="fi
(2) 
(3) 
Thus the expected discounted present value of firm i equals what it would be in a Cournot 
environment, plus the single-period gain in returns to colluding, appropriately discounted. 
Inequality (1), the defining condition for Nash equilibrium, can now be rewritten 
V, (r) s V, (y1) for all r and I 
The first-order condition for ( 4) is 
v,' (y1) = 0 for all i .
Using the fact that (f /g )' = 0 if and only if f 'g - f g' = 0, (5) is equivalent to 
(4) 
(5) 
for all i. 
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0 = [1-,B+ (,B-,BT)F(i/p( �Y1))h;()i,) 
):S• 
+ (,8-,BT)/(p/p ( � Y1»fW'( �Y1)/(p( �Y1))2]('Y1{)11) - 01) 
):S• ):S• }:S• 
(6) 
Equation (6) states that the marginal return to a firm from increasing its production in normal 
periods ( 'Y;()i,)) must be offset exactly by the marginal increase in risk of suffering a loss in 
returns ('Y1{)11) - 61) by triggering a reversionary episode. When this condition bolds for all 
firms, n differential constraints are placed on the n-dimensional vector y of restricted outputs 
in equilibrium. Thus, the assertion that an equilibrium which satisfies an additional constraint 
exists will require careful justification. In particular, the output profile which maximizes total 
returns to the industry may not be supportable in equilibrium. 7 
There are two related final observations about the formal model of collusion under uncertainty. 
First, no firm ever defects from the cartel. More precisely, no firm ; has any private 
information that would lead it to assess its return function 1r/ more accurately than its 
competitors do. Thus, every competitor is able to figure out what ; will do to maximize profits. 
The market price reveals information about demand only, and never leads i's competitors to 
revise their beliefs about how much i has produced. In equilibrium, the frequency of reversion 
from normal states will be given by F(ji/p ("'J;y1)). 
Second, despite the fact that firms know that low prices reflect demand conditions rather than 
overproduction by competitors, it is rational for them to participate in reversionary episodes. 8 
Basically, a reversionary episode is just a temporary switch to a Nash equilibrium in 
noncontingent strategies. It doesn't pay any firm to deviate unilaterally from its Nash strategy 
in this temporary situation, any more than it would if the industry were permanently a Cournot 
industry. It might be asked why Cournot equilibrium is appropriate at all. If firms know at a 
particular time that a low price has been observed in the past, and that the cartel has had a 
perfect record of monopolistic conduct, why do firms not disregard the price and continue to act 
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monopolistically? The answer is that everyone understands the incentive properties of 
equilibrium. If firms did not revert to Cournot behavior in response to low prices, equation (5) 
would not hold the rest of the time, so monopolistic behavior would cease to be individually 
optimal for firms. 
We realize that the assumptions about industry structure are quite restrictive. We emphasize 
that the particular Nash equilibrium we are studying is not the only sort of Nash equilibrium 
which would be collusive according to the definition offered in this section, and that evidence 
that this particular Nash equilibrium operates in a specific industry is not the only evidence 
relevant to forming an opinion about the extent of collusion in various sectors of the economy. 
However, even though the direct applicability of our model is severely limited, it would be 
valuable to examine an industry for which it would be appropriate. We believe that the 
American rail freight industry in the 1880s was one example of an industry which satisfies our 
structural conditions quite well. Studies of that industry by Paul MacAvoy [7) and Thomas 
Ulen [15,16) have produced qualitative conclusions which are consistent with our model. 
Recent econometric work by Porter [10) (based on the extensive time series data collected by 
Ulen) strengthens these conclusions. 
3. PRICE PROCESSES GENERATED BY COLLUSION 
The equilibrium discussed in the preceding section is noteworthy because it reverses the 
fraditional interpretations of a certain kind of industry price pattern. According to these 
traditional interpretations, an episode in which price drops sharply, remains low for some time, 
and then sharply rises again without there being an apparent cost or demand shock would 
indicate one of two possible events. The episode might be a symptom of the predatory reaction 
of incumbent firms to a threatened entry. Alternatively, it might signal (as in Stigler's theory) 
a breakdown of a cartel agreement followed by the reestablishment of the agreement. In either 
case, such evidence would indicate the fragility of collusion among the incumbents. Thus, in 
the formulation of policy, it has sometimes been argued that intervention to promote 
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competition would likely be redundant in markets where these episodes are already occurring. 
In marked contrast, such episodes play an essential role in the maintenance of an ongoing 
scheme of collusive incentives in the model presented here. While the traditional views would 
predict the transience of collusion in a market marked by these episodes of price depression, 
and with the demise of collusion also the cessation of the price instability which it engendered, 
our model suggests that industries having certain structural characteristics (i.e., the four 
characteristics enumerated in the previous section) will exhibit price instability as a feature of a 
stable, time-stationary pattern of prices if its member firms are colluding. This observation 
raises the question of whether it is possible to estimate consistently, from the stochastic process 
of prices generated by a collusive equilibrium of the form described in Section 2, the trigger 
price p and the reversionary length T which determine that equilibrium. The answer to this 
question is affirmative. Moreover, there also exists an estimator which is computationally 
attractive and which has only a small asymptotic bias if the interval between price observations 
is short relative to both the length of reversionary episodes and the expected length of normal 
episodes - the situation which one would expect to encounter in an industry where collusion 
actually did confer significant market power on firms. 
While a discussion of estimation per se lies beyond the scope of this paper, we characterize in
an Appendix9 the stochastic process of prices which arises in the equilibrium of the model 
presented in Section 2. It can be shown that any data series of prices may be treated as a 
sample path of a stationary ergodic process. This result provides a foundation for the study of 
asymptotic properties of estimation of the model, because it justifies the use of the ergodic 
theorem [l,Thm.6.28) to generalize the role which the law of large numbers plays in the 
estimation theory of independent processes.10 (In particular, the existence of consistent 
estimators of p and T is a consequence of the ergodic theorem.) In the Appendix, the price 
process will be compared to an alternative process which is a Markov version of the well-known 
Bernoulli switching process (cf. [6]). In his study of the rail freight industry [10), Porter uses 
an estimator which is a maximum likelihood estimator for a Bernoulli process, rather than for 
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the process predicted by our theoretical model. It can be shown that a data series of prices may 
be regarded as a 'contaminated sample path' of the alternative process, and the degree of 
contamination will be computed as a function of the true parameters of the equilibrium. This 
analysis provides a justification for the interpretation of Porter's empirical findings in terms of 
the present theory. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. These problems, involving both the nature of the cross-industry data and also the logical 
difficulties of using it as a basis for inference are described in the essays by J. McGee, 
H. Demsetz and L. Weiss in [4]. 
2. A referee has suggested that the U.S. steel industry employed such an enforcement 
device in the first half of this century. 
3. For example, a "phases of the moon" system has been used to allocate low-bidding 
privileges in the high voltage switchgear industry. (See Scherer [11,Ch.6].) 
4. It is logically possible for this agreement to be a tacit one which arises spontaneously. 
Nevertheless, in view of the relative complexity of the conduct to be specified by this 
particular equilibrium and of the need for close coordination among its participants, it 
seems natural to assume here that the equilibrium arises from an explicit agreement. 
S. James Friedman has suggested to us that the variables 81 might alternatively be specified 
to be a martingale, so that the prices Pt would also be a martingale. This property ought 
to be satisfied if the good is a durable, or if consumption is perfectly substitutable across 
times. We retain the i.i.d. specification which makes the analysis simpler, but 
acknowledge that it is restrictive. 
6. For simplicity, we are considering only the simplest variant of a trigger price strategy. For 
example, firms might condition T on the amount by which if exceeds the observed 
market price. 
7. In [9] it is shown that, for symmetric firms under imperfect price information, the output 
profile for normal periods which will maximize discounted industry profits in a 
noncooperative equilibrium in trigger price strategies is different from the profile which 
would be chosen if the industry were a monopoly. I.e., firms forego some profits in 
normal periods in order to reduce the frequency and duration of reversion needed to 
F-2 
provide appropriate incentives, if if and T are chosen to maximize expected discounted 
profits subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (5). 
8. To be precise, we argue here that the equilibrium is perfect or sequentially rational. A 
formal statement and proof of this assertion are given in [5]. 
9. This appendix is available from the authors upon request. 
I 0. A stochastic process is ergodic if every event definable in terms of the tails of sample 
paths (e.�., the set of sample points having convergent paths) has probability zero or one. 
The ergodic theorem extends the strong law of large numbers to such processes. 
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APPENDIX 
To begin, consider a very general definition of the class of stochastic processes which will be 
under consideration. The observed price process {X1}1EIN will be determined by two processes 
{Y, )1 EIN' the price process which would ensue if all periods were normal (i.e., if the industry 
were to produce the restricted output vector y at all times), and {Z1 )1E IN' the price process 
which would ensue if all periods were reversionary (i.e., if the industry were to operate in 
Cournot equilibrium at all times, producing the output vector z ). Whether the observed price 
is drawn from the normal or the reversionary distribution is determined by a process {W1}1EIN'
which specifies whether the industry is in a normal or a reversionary state. Note that {X1}1EIN
is the only component of the joint process ( W1 ,X1 ,Y, ,Z1)}1EIN which is observed. 
Formally, define a s witching process to be determined by a probability space ( ll ,,B,m ), a state 
space S ,  a subset N !:;;; S ,  and four sequences of random variables {W} = (W,:ll -+S}1EIN'
{X} = {X1: ll -+ IR}1EIN' {Y) = {Y,: ll -+ IR}1EIN and {Z} = {Z1: ll -+ IR}1EIN which satisfy 
{Y}U {Z} is a set of independent r.v.'s, 
{Y} is identically distributed with c.d.f. G, 
{Z) is identically distributed with c.d.f. H, 
( W} is a Markov process with stationary 
transition probabilities, 
'Vt S, E N => X, = Y, w.p. l ,
\>'t S,  � N => X, =Z1 w.p. l .
(Al) 
(A2) 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(AS) 
(A6) 
Note that the special case of a switching process usually studied occurs when S = {O, l }, 
N = {O}, and {W} is a Bernoulli process which is independent of {Y} U {Z}. 
In the case of a collusive price process, G and H are the c.d.f. 's of the normal and reversionary 
A-2 
price distributions, respectively. S = {O, ... ,T-1} and N = {O}. (I.e., W, = O signifies that the 
industry is in a normal period at time I.) The Markov process {W} is defined recursively by 
starting with an arbitrary W 0: {) -+ S, and then imposing 
if W,(w) = 0 and Yj(w) <?: p, then W,+1(w) = 0,
if W,(w) = 0 and Yj(w) < p, then W1+1(w) = 1,
if W,(w) = k, 1 S k < T -1, then Wr+1(w) = k + 1,
if W1(w) = T -1, then W,+1(w) = 0. 
(A7) 
(AS) 
(A9) 
(AlO) 
The process {W} defined by (A7)-(Al0) is Markov with stationary transition probabilities 
because, by (Al) and (A2), {Y} is i.i.d. The transition graph of {W} is shown in Figure 1, in 
which each arrow is labeled with its transition probability. 
The aim is to show that W0 can be chosen in such a way that {X} will be a stationary ergodic 
process. Conditions (AS) and (A6) show that X1(w) is a function of (W1(w),Yj(w),Z1(w)), so 
by [l,Prop.6.32] it is sufficient to show that the joint process {W,Y,Z) is ergodic. By 
[l,Thm.7.16], this process is ergodic if it is a stationary Markov process having a unique 
invariant distribution (i.e., a unique distribution such that, if W1 is defined by (A7)-(A10), 
then {Wo,Yo,Zol and {Wi.Yi.Z il have identical joint distributions). This follows from 
[l ,Thm.7.18], completing the proof that {X} is ergodic. 
In [10], a maximum likelihood estimator for a switching process somewhat different from 
(Al)-(AlO) is used to study the pre-ICC rail freight cartel in the U.S. That process is obtained 
by replacing (Al), (A2) and (A7)-(Al0) with 
{Y) is identically distributed with c.d.f. (Al l) 
J(p) = max[(l-G(p})-1(G(p)-G (p}),O]. 
(I.e., J is the distribution of p according to G, conditional on p <?: p.) 
{ W} U {Y} U {Z} is a set of independent random variables, (Al 2) 
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and 
{ W} is a stationary Markov process having the transition (All) 
probabilities specified by Figure 2. • 
That is, this process is defined by relaxing the usual assumption that the switching process is 
Bernoulli, while retaining the assumption that it is independent of the underlying variables 
which determine the observed prices. Call the process defined by (Al)-(AlO) the price process, 
and that defined by (A3)-(AS), (Al l)-(Al3) the approximating proceu. 
The advantage of the approximating process over the price process is that it permits adaptation 
of much of the work which has been done on maximum-likelihood estimation of the Bernoulli 
switching process. In particular, it is possible both to compute the ML estimator economically 
and to appeal to theoretical results asserting its consistency and asymptotic normality. The 
crucial question raised by use of the approximating process is of how seriously misspecified it is 
as a model for data actually generated by the price process. We now address this question. 
The basis for comparing the two processes is that, given a stationary price process {W ,X,Y,Z} 
with parameters (p,T,G ,H ), a stationary approximating process {W',X',Y',Z') with the same 
parameters can be obtained by a kind of censoring. Looking at the matter from the opposite 
perspective, the sample paths of Z can be viewed as a contaminated (by reinsertion of the 
censored observations) version of the approximating process. The extent of the contamination 
is easily computable from the parameters of the process. If it is slight, and if the ML estimator 
is regarded as robust, then the ML estimator of the approximating process should also be 
considered to have small asymptotic bias as an estimator of the price process. 
The approximating process (W',X',Y',Z') is defined from {W ,X,Y,Z} simply by censoring the 
• Using extensive information including industry prices, macroeconomic variables, and firm-specific quantity data, 
Porter estimates the structural equations of a detailed industry model. His method may be viewed as an imposition 
of prior constraints on the reduced-form estimation described here. 
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triggering events (i.e., the events in which W, = 0 and Y, < ji). Formally, this is done by 
means of a sequence of stopping times (.,., : 0 ...., IN}1EIN' Define 
and 
Then define 
{l if W0(w) -0 and Y0(w) < jf 
To(w) - 0 otherwise
!'T1(w) + 2 if w,,( .. )+t(W) -0 and Y,,( .. )+1(w) < jf 
'Ti+i(w) - T1(w) + 1 otherwise. 
(Al4) 
(AlS) 
(Al6) 
Finally, take a set {Y,\EN which are identically distributed with c.d.f. J and such that
{Y}U{Z}U{Y"} is independent, and define 
, !Y,,c..i(w) if W,
1
(w) = O 
Y, (w) - /1 I 
Y, (w) if W, (w) > 0 .
(Al7) 
(N.B. The definition of the observed component {X'} of the approximating process is the same 
whether {Y'} is defined by (Al7) or by Yj
1
(w) -Y,,c..J(w) for all w. The reason for using 
(Al7) is both to satisfy (All) and to keep {W'} and {Y'} independent so that (Al 2) is satisfied. 
Under the simpler definition, (AlS) would have introduced dependency between them.) 
The effect of (AIS) and (Al6) is to continue to let a low realization of Yj be the event which 
causes the state to change from zero to one, but to censor this event if it occurs. Thus the 
dependence of W,+1 on {W,,Y,} in the price process is removed, and (Al2) holds. By the 
strong Markov property [l,Prop.7.8], the censored process is a stationary Markov process, so 
(Al3) holds. I.e., {W',X',Y',Z'} is an approximating process with parameters (jf,T ,J,H). 
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It remains to calculate how much censoring of the price series X ( w) is required to construct the 
approximating series X'(w). (Alternatively, how much contamination of X'(w) is required to 
reconstruct X(w)?) Formally, what is lim .,., 
(�) � 1 ? If this quotient is close to zero for
, __ .,., "' 
almost every w, then the asymptotic bias of the approximating-process ML estimator applied to 
data generated by the price process should be small. 
To calculate the quotient, first define a(W,Y) = 1 if W = 0 and Y < jf, and a(W,Y) = 0 
•,( .. ) 
otherwise. By·(Al4) and (AlS), T1(w) -t + � a(W.(w),Y.(w)), or 
By the ergodic theorem, 
u-0 
'T1 (w) -t 1 
•,(.,) 
( ) -
-( -) � a(W.(w),Y.(w)) . 'T1 w 'T1 w u-0 
1 •,( .. ) lim -(-) � a(W.(w),Y
.(w)) = m({W0 = O,Y0 < jf}) G (p} a.s. 
,.._ 'Tt w u-0 
(Al8) 
(Al9) 
(Recall that m is the stationary measure on {}.) Combining (Al8) and (Al9), and appealing to 
the fact that the stationarity of the price process forces W 0 and Y0 to be independent, yields 
T1(w) -t 
lim ( ) =m
({W0=0})G(pja.s. , __ .,., 
"' 
(A20) 
The calculation of m({W0=0}) is an easy matter. For l:Sk<T- l, by (A9) and 
stationarity, we have 
m({W0=k)) =m({W1 =k + l})-m({W0=k + 1)) . (A21) 
Also, by (A7) and stationarity, we have 
m({W0= 1)) =m({W1=1)) =m({W0=0})G {pj. (A22) 
Since the probabilities of the states sum to unity, (A21) and (A22) yield 
m ({W 0 = O}) = [l + (T - l)G (pj]-1 . (A23) 
Thus, by (A22) and (A23), 
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Jim T,(w)-t -G(p}[l + (T -l)G(p}]-l, 1-oo T1 (W) 
(A24) 
For example, consider a hypothetical industry in which a trade association disseminates weelcly 
price data to its mcm bcrs. I.e., the appropriate interpretation of a period in the discrete-time 
model is one week. Suppose that the parameters of this industry were estimated using the ML 
estimator for the approximating process, with the results that G <fi) -.025 and T = 1 1. Since
the expected duration of an episode of normal conduct is ( G (p} )-1, these estimates indicate 
that a rcvcrsionary episode occurs once a year on average, and lasts ten weeks. Thus there is 
(on average) one price observation a year (that being the observation of the price which 
triggers the revcrsionary episode), which would not be included if the approximating process 
were really generating the data. This is a contamination ratio of one in fifty, or 
(.025)[1 + .25]-l which is the expression which is obtained from (A24). 
The ML estimator is computed by dividing the data into two sub-samples, one of which is 
presumed to have been drawn from distribution G and the other from H, and then estimating 
these distributions from the respective subsamples. If the •contaminating• observations were to 
comprise equal proportions of the two subsamples, then each subsample is being estimated with 
2 percent contamination, and one might reasonably suppose the discrepancy between the price 
process and the approximating process to be rather small. If all of the •contaminating• 
observations were assigned to the subsample presumed to be generated by normal conduct, 
then this subsample would have 2-1/2 percent contamination, which still might reasonably be 
ignored. However, if the •contaminating• observations were all included in the subsample 
presumed to reflect reversionary conduct, then that subsample would have a 10 percent 
contamination level. In this worst case, it is easy to imagine that the observations actually 
drawn from the lower tail of G would seriously bias the estimation of H. 
The parameter estimates for the example just given are approximately the same as those 
reported by Porter [10) for the rail freight industry. Thus, while the foregoing analysis is 
insufficiently precise to rule out the worst-case assumption concerning bias of his estimator 
A-7 
relative to the price process, it has shown that under more optimistic assumptions the bias 
would plausibly be slight. While we acknowledge that there is an inevitable element of 
subjective judgment in a situation such as this, we suggest that Porter's study provides 
presumptive evidence that the rail freight industry may have exemplified the kind of 
equilibrium which has been studied here. 
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